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2Abstract
Cognitive control theories attribute action control to executive processes that modulate behavior based 
on expectancy or task rules. Here we examined corticospinal excitability and behavioral performance 
in a go/no-go task. Go and no-go trials were presented in runs of 5, and runs alternated predictably. At 
the beginning of each trial, subjects indicated whether they expected a go trial or a no-go trial. 
Analyses revealed that subjects immediately adjusted their expectancy ratings when a new run started. 
However, motor excitability was primarily associated with the properties of the previous trial, rather 
than the predicted properties of the current trial. We also observed a large go latency cost at the 
beginning of a go run. These findings indicate that actions in predictable environments are 
substantially influenced by previous events, even if this goes against conscious expectancies about 
upcoming events. 
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3Scientists often attribute goal-directed behavior to a top-down executive control system (Verbruggen, 
McLaren, & Chambers, 2014). One of its main functions is biasing competition between stimulus or 
response options based on expectancy or task rules. For example, when the control system predicts a 
certain action, it will pre-activate the motor network, biasing action selection and reducing the 
response latency of the anticipated action (Bestmann, 2012). However, in environments where there is 
much uncertainty about upcoming events, decision-making also relies on choice history and other 
subtle sources of evidence that are not consciously monitored (Bode et al., 2014). Consistent with this 
idea, response latencies and expectancy can be dissociated under conditions of uncertainty (Perruchet, 
Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2006). Thus, action control may depend on an interplay between top-
down and bottom-up factors. 
Top-down biasing is assumed to reduce the influence of bottom-up factors. Nevertheless, task 
inertia and sequential effects have been observed in many executive control paradigms (e.g. Egner, 
2014), even when subjects are given the opportunity to bias activation in advance (e.g. 
Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). Top-down control in previous studies may have 
been suboptimal because there was usually some remaining uncertainty about upcoming events (i.e. 
the environment was never entirely predictable). Alternatively, the bottom-up influences could 
indicate that there are limits to executive control. Therefore, the present study explored whether action 
and expectancy could be dissociated in entirely predictable environments. Finding such a dissociation 
would indicate that, even when people can precisely predict what will happen on the next trial, 
bottom-up factors still influence performance; in other words, people would never be immune from 
what happened in the (recent) past.
We examined top-down control in a go/no-go task in which runs of go and no-go trials alternated 
predictably. On each trial, we obtained expectancy ratings and measured corticospinal motor 
excitability before the presentation of the go or no-go stimulus. We also measured response latencies 
on go trials. Based on the top-down biasing account, we predicted that motor excitability would 
increase and response latencies would decrease when subjects expected a go response (indicating pre-
activation of the motor network; see above); by contrast, excitability should decrease and latencies 
should increase when subjects expected a no-go response (see e.g. Bestman, 2012; Leocani, Cohen, 
Wassermann, Ikoma, & Hallett, 2000; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). 
4Method
Subjects performed a predictable go/no-go task (Figure 1). On both go and no-go trials, we asked 
subjects to indicate whether they expected a go or no-go trial, and we measured muscular responses 
(motor evoked potentials; MEPs) to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the primary motor 
cortex. MEPs are a measure of corticospinal excitability (Hallett, 2007), and are very useful to 
examine anticipatory influences on the pre-motor and motor cortex because they can be measured 
before a stimulus appears. On go trials, we also examined response latencies because latency 
differences between go trials can also reveal response biases (see above).
Subjects
Sixteen students (14 females; mean age: 20.9 years, range: 18-24) from the University of Exeter 
participated in this experiment. All subjects were right-handed and were paid £15 for their 
participation. The experiment was approved by the local research ethics committee at the School of 
Psychology, University of Exeter. Written informed consent was obtained after the nature and possible 
consequences of the study was explained. One subject was replaced because an interview at the end of 
the experiment indicated that the subject did not realize that trials were presented in runs of 5, even 
though this was explicitly mentioned during the instruction phase. Sample size was determined in 
advance, assuming a large effect of the entirely predictable run types (i.e. go vs. no-go).
5Figure 1: A. The run sequence: Go and no-go trials were presented in runs of 5, and runs alternated predictably 
producing a cycle of events as shown. B. Example of a trial sequence. Each trial started with the presentation of 
a blank screen. After a variable time interval, a brown cylinder appeared, and participants rated the extent to 
which they thought the no-go stimulus would appear. After 5 seconds, the go (e.g. ‘peanut butter’) or no-go 
stimulus (e.g. ‘brown sugar’) appeared. The go stimulus remained on screen until a response was made, whereas 
the no-go stimulus disappeared after 2 seconds. A TMS pulse (indicated by the lightning bolt in the figure) was 
delivered at one of two different time points in a trial, either 2.5 seconds into the blank interval (Pulse1) or 
immediately after the participant had indicated their expectancy rating (Pulse 2). See Method section for further 
details.
6Behavioral Task
The experiment was run on a 21.5-inch iMac using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). After the motor 
threshold was determined (see Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation section), task instructions were 
presented on the screen and confirmed verbally with the subjects. Subjects were told that go and no-
go trials would be presented in runs of 5 (Figure 1A), and that the runs would alternate predictably 
(see Supplementary Material for the exact instructions).
We used a modified version of a task that was originally designed to explore the relationship 
between expectancy and response latencies under conditions of uncertainty (McAndrew, Yeates, 
Verbruggen, McLaren, 2013)1. The trial sequence is shown in Figure 1B. Each trial started with the 
presentation of a blank screen. Duration varied between 3 to 4 seconds. Then the brown cylinder (11 x 
7 cm) was presented in the center against a white background, and subjects had to rate the extent to 
which they thought the no-go stimulus would appear. They had to do this using the numerical keypad 
with their right hand. The rating could range from 1 (definitely not a no-go trial) to 5 (I do not know 
either way) to 9 (definitely a no-go trial). After 5 seconds, the words 'peanut butter' or 'brown sugar' 
appeared. For half of the subjects, ‘peanut butter’ was the go stimulus and ‘brown sugar’ was the no-
go stimulus; for the others, this mapping was reversed. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly 
as possible when the go stimulus appeared, but to withhold their response when the no-go stimulus 
appeared. Go responses were made using a mouse with the left index finger. The mouse was mounted 
vertically with the buttons surfaces facing laterally; subjects could respond with a mouse button press 
by moving the left index finger inward in a lateral abduction. This movement is optimal for measuring 
EMG from the index (first dorsal interosseous; FDI) muscle (for a similar set-up with numerical 
keypads, see e.g. Claffey, Sheldon, Stinear, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010). The go stimulus remained on 
screen until a response was made, whereas the no-go stimulus disappeared after 2 seconds. If subjects 
responded to the no-go stimulus, an error sound was presented as feedback. Go and no-go stimuli 
were presented with equal probability. There were 208 trials in this experiment, split into 8 blocks of 
26 trials. We analyzed performance as a function of the previous trial(s), so we excluded the first trial 
of a block from the analyses. Subjects could move around between blocks. Whether the experiment 
started with a run of go trials or no-go trials was counterbalanced across subjects.
1  Our experiment initially included a between-subjects condition in which the go/no-go sequence was 
unpredictable. Here we will focus on the predictable condition only because there were not enough observations 
for the longer run lengths (run positions Go4-5 and NoGo4-5 in Figure 1A) in the unpredictable condition; this 
was due to an issue with the randomization. Furthermore, the effect over runs is expected to be much smaller in 
the unpredictable condition, so much larger sample sizes would be needed to obtain sufficient statistical power 
in this condition.
7Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
Subjects completed a TMS safety screening questionnaire and were found to be free of 
contraindications. After they had completed the questionnaire and informed consent had been 
obtained, they were seated in a chair with a mounted chin rest, which helped maintain head position. 
The left hand and inner forearm were cleaned with alcohol before MEP electrode attachment. Two 
surface Ag–AgCl hydrogel electrodes (Biopac EL501) were positioned over the FDI muscle on the 
left hand and a ground electrode over the left inner forearm. A snug-fitting cap and earplugs were 
provided for the subject and a subject tracker was positioned on the centre of the forehead. 
We used a MagStim 200-2 system with a BiStim module (Magstim, Whitland, UK) and a figure-
of-eight coil (7-cm-diameter) to deliver TMS pulses, and Brainsight (version 2.2.10) software to 
record MEPs and track the position of the coil. The TMS calibration phase began with a few test 
pulses to ensure the subject was comfortable. If the subject was happy to continue, the motor hotspot 
was identified by looking for a visually perceptible movement that was isolated to the left index 
finger. This location was marked as the target position relative to the subject tracker using the 
Brainsight software. At this point, the TMS coil was fixed over the motor hotspot and the subject’s 
head was fixed using a head restraint and the chin rest. Then we determined the resting motor 
threshold by finding the lowest stimulus intensity that produced MEPs of at least 0.05mV amplitude 
on at least 5 out of 10 trials (Rossini et al., 1994). Next, the subject’s 1mV threshold was determined 
by finding the stimulus intensity that produced MEPs of approximately 1mV at rest. Once the 1mV 
threshold was found, the restraint was removed and the behavioral procedure was explained. During 
the experiment, the subject’s head was fixed again. 
TMS pulses were delivered at one of two different time points in a trial, either 2.5 seconds into the 
blank interval (Pulse1) or during the cylinder presentation after the prediction rating (Pulse 2). The 
delivery of Pulse 2 was contingent on subjects making a rating, which could be done at any point 
during the 5 seconds presentation. If a prediction was not made (2.13% of the trials) a pulse was 
delivered at the end of this 5 second period. Of the 208 trials, 104 were Pulse 1 and 104 were Pulse 2 
trials. 
Data Analysis
All data files and R analysis scripts are deposited in the Open Research Exeter repository (http://
hdl.handle.net/10871/19257).
Expectancy ratings. To allow a direct comparison with the MEP data (see Figure 2), raw 
expectancy scores were converted (converted score = 10 - raw expectancy score), so that higher 
scores indicate that subjects expected a go trial (range: 9 = definitely a go trial; 1 = definitely a no-go 
8trial). Because we were particularly interested in the transitions from Go trials to No-Go trials and 
vice-versa, we used paired t-tests and the corresponding Bayes factors (see Table 1 for further details) 
to compare the expectancy ratings for Go1 trials (the first trial of a go run; Figure 1A) with the ratings 
for the adjacent NoGo5 (the last trial of a no-go run) and Go2 trials (the second trial of a go run); 
similarly, we compared NoGo1 trials (the first trial of a run of no-go trials) with the Go5 (the last trial 
of a go run) and NoGo2 trials (the second trial of a no-go run). We calculated Bayes factors because 
they can provide support for the null hypothesis (i.e. no difference between trial types; Dienes, 2014). 
For completeness, we also report in the Appendix the results of a repeated measures ANOVA with 
Run Type (Go or No-go) and Run Position (first, second, third, fourth, or fifth position in a run; see 
Figure 1A) as within-subjects factors, and expectancy as dependent variable. Initially, a three factor 
ANOVA was run on the expectancy ratings incorporating the variables Pulse, Run Type, and Run 
Position to determine whether Pulse influenced the expectancy data. There was no main effect of 
Pulse (p = .57) and Pulse did not interact with the run variables (all p’s > .35), so the Pulse 1 and Pulse 
2 data were collapsed. 
MEPs. Peak-to-peak MEP amplitude on every trial was defined by the Brainsight software as the 
difference between the minimum and maximum EMG signal 10 to 90 ms after TMS delivery. Any 
trial on which the coil had drifted more than 7mm away from the defined motor hotspot was excluded 
from the MEP analyses (6.75%). This exclusion criterion was determined in advance (based on pilot 
work, which showed that MEP amplitude decreased substantially when the coil moved away from the 
hot spot too much). We did not exclude any further trials. To examine pre-TMS baseline activity, we 
calculated root mean square EMG activity in the 50 ms preceding the TMS pulse for each condition, 
and found it to be generally low (mean RMS: 26 μV, sd = 51 μV). 
For both Pulse 1 and Pulse 2 trials, we used paired t-tests and Bayes factors to compare the 
transitions from Go trials to No-Go trials and vice-versa (see Expectancy Rating analysis). Inspection 
of Figure 2 and the difference scores in Table 1 showed that similar numerical patterns were observed 
for Pulse 1 and Pulse 2 trials2. Thus, to make optimal use of the information provided by the MEP 
measures, we calculated meta-analytic Bayes factors for multiple t-tests (Rouder & Morey, 2011). 
Finally, we also ran two-way ANOVAs to assess the impact of Run type and Run Position. 
RT. Any RT that was over 2 standard deviations away from the individual subject’s mean RT was 
excluded from analyses. The data were averaged and analyzed as a function of Run Position (see 
Expectancy analysis). Note that RT data were only produced on go trials. Initially, a two factor 
2 MEP amplitude was generally lower for Pulse 2 than Pulse 1. This could be due to the execution of the 
expectancy response with the other hand or to a general braking mechanism employed before response 
execution (Duque et al., 2010). 
9ANOVA was run on the RT data incorporating the variables Pulse and Run Position to determine 
whether Pulse influenced the RT data. There was no main effect of Pulse (p = .27) and Pulse did not 
interact with Run Position (p = .77), so the Pulse 1 and Pulse 2 data were collapsed. 
Go and no-go accuracy. Percentage of missed go responses and percentage of incorrect responses 
on no-go trials (false alarms) appear in Table A1 (Appendix). Because percentages were very low, we 
did not analyze them further. 
Results
The expectancy ratings, MEPs, and reaction times for go trials appear in Figure 2 and Table A1 
(Appendix). Table 1 provides an detailed overview of the pairwise comparisons and Table A2 
(Appendix) provides an overview of the corresponding univariate analyses. Note that the data pattern 
looked qualitatively similar when we included only go trials for which the expectancy rating was 8 or 
9 (‘definitely a go trial’), and no-go trials for which the rating was 1 or 2 (‘definitely a no-go trial’) 
(see Supplementary Information). 
Figure 2 shows that subjects kept track of the run sequence3: The expectancy rating was 
significantly higher (i.e. subjects expected a go trial) for the first trial of a go run (Go1; rating: 7.05) 
than for the last trial of a no-go run (NoGo5; rating: 2.47), p = .001, BF = 670.41 (Table 1), whereas it 
was significantly lower for the first trial of a no-go run (NoGo1; rating: 2.97) than for the last trial of a 
go run (Go5; rating: 7.49), p = .001, BF = 1419.49. Thus, subjects immediately adjusted their 
expectancy ratings when a new run started. The Go1-Go2 and NoGo1-NoGo2 comparisons (Table 1) 
suggest that some subjects further adjusted their expectancy ratings after the first trial of a run. 
However, these within-run differences (i.e. Go1-Go2 and NoGo1-NoGo2) were small compared with 
the between-run differences (i.e. NoGo5-Go1 and Go5-NoGo1; see Table 1).
3 Most subjects (N = 14) mentioned at the end of the experiment that they counted the number of trials to keep 
track of the sequence. 
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Figure 2: Expectancy, MEP, and RT data. Top left panel: Expectancy ratings. 1 indicates that participants 
strongly expected a no-go trial, 9 indicates that they strongly expected a go trial (see also Table 2). Top right and 
bottom left panel: Amplitude (in microvolts) of MEPs recorded from left FDI following right M1 TMS for Pulse 
1 (top right panel) and Pulse 2 (bottom left panel) trials. A comparison with the expectancy panel shows that the 
expectancy and MEP data are misaligned. A rotation of one ‘spoke’ would fix this. Bottom right panel: Reaction 
times (in milliseconds) on go trials.
Unlike the expectancy rating pattern, the MEP pattern was not consistent with the run sequence 
(Figure 2). As mentioned in the Method section, we calculated meta-analytic Bayes factors (BFM), 
combining the Pulse 1 and Pulse 2 t-tests shown in Table 1. The meta-analyses revealed large within-
run differences: As can be seen in Figure 2, MEP increased substantially after the first go trial (BFM = 
242.66, thus providing decisive evidence for HA), and decreased substantially after the first no-go trial 
(BFM = 12.10, thus providing strong evidence for HA). Note that the univariate analysis also provided 
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support for the idea that MEP changed within runs (see Table A2): the significant Type x Position 
interactions indicate that corticospinal excitability did not only change between runs (as shown by the 
main effects) but also within runs (as shown by the interactions). Importantly, the between-run 
differences were numerically smaller than the within-run differences (see effect sizes Table 1) or even 
absent: The NoGo5-Go1 comparison was inconclusive (BFM = 1.11), but the Go5-NoGo1 comparison 
provided substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e. no MEP difference between the trial types; 
BFM = 0.19). Thus, the meta-analytic Bayes factors and inspection of the effect sizes (Table 1) indicate 
that the fluctuations in expectancy ratings and the MEP data did not correspond: The expectancy 
analyses revealed large between-run differences but small within-run differences; by contrast, the 
MEP analyses revealed numerically small or no between-run differences but large within-run 
differences. 
Table 1: Overview of paired t-tests (df = 15) to explore the effect of run transition. Hedge’s gav is the reported 
effect size measure (Lakens, 2013). P-values < .05 are in bold. BF = Bayes Factor.
Note: The Bayes factor is an odds ratio: It is the probability of the data under one hypothesis relative to that 
under another (Wetzels et al., 2011). Evidence categories for Bayes Factor: BF < .33 = Substantial evidence for 
H0; 1/3–1 = Anecdotal evidence for H0; 1 = No evidence; 1–3 = Anecdotal evidence for HA; 3–10 = Substantial 
evidence for HA;  BF > 10 =  strong to decisive evidence for HA. H0  = no difference between the trial types; HA = 
a difference between the trial types. We calculated the Bayes factors reported in the table (BF) and the meta-
analytic Bayes factors (BFM) reported in the Result section with the BayesFactor package in R, using the default 
prior (0.707).
Comparison
Expectancy
MEP Pulse 1
MEP Pulse 2
RT
NoGo5 – Go1
Go1 − Go2
Go5 – NoGo1
NoGo1 − NoGo2
NoGo5 – Go1
Go1 − Go2
Go5 – NoGo1
NoGo1 − NoGo2
NoGo5 – Go1
Go1 − Go2
Go5 – NoGo1
NoGo1 − NoGo2
Go1 − Go2
difference
-4.58
-0.67
4.52
0.82
-62
-915
19
454
-188
-462
-8
219
109
lower CI
-6.28
-1.37
2.97
-0.15
-223
-1371
-288
-18
-380
-891
-328
30
36
upper CI
-2.88
0.03
6.07
1.79
99
-459
326
925
5
-32
313
409
183
t(15)
5.754
2.039
6.220
1.793
0.820
4.277
0.132
2.049
2.08
2.29
0.053
2.472
3.173
p
.001
.059
.001
.093
.425
.001
.897
.058
.055
.037
.959
.026
.006
gav
2.600
0.375
2.632
0.483
0.060
0.727
0.014
0.337
0.234
0.393
0.007
0.208
0.497
BF
670.41
1.316
1419.49
0.938
0.343
54.604
0.257
1.334
1.394
1.905
0.256
2.522
8.023
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Consistent with the MEP data, we observed a substantial go RT difference between the first trial of 
a go run (Go1; 660 ms) and the second trial of the run (Go2; 550 ms), p = .006, BF = 8.02 (Table 2). 
Thus, the expectancy data and the RT data are out of phase as well (Figure 2): RT was longer after a 
run of no-go trials than after a single go trial, even though the runs were entirely predictable (and 
expectancy ratings indicated that subjects were fully aware of the run sequence).
Discussion
We examined top-down control in a go/no-go task in which subjects knew in advance whether they 
had to execute a go response or not. We anticipated that the expectancy ratings, MEPs and RTs would 
correspond in predictable environments because the top-down control system could bias actions. The 
expectancy ratings confirmed that subjects kept track of the run sequence: they anticipated a go trial at 
the beginning of a run of go trials, and a no-go trial at the beginning of a run of no-go trials. To our 
surprise, this was not reflected in the MEP and RT data. Motor excitability changed substantially after 
the first trial of a run, but it did not change much between runs. This suggests that motor excitability 
was primarily associated with the response properties of the previous trial (i.e. a no-go or go 
response), rather than the predicted properties of the current trial. The RT analysis also revealed a 
substantial cost at the beginning of a run: RTs were longer for Go1 trials than for Go2 trials, even 
though subjects clearly anticipated a go response on both trials.
How did previous events influence performance if the between-trial effects were not due to 
expectancy and top-down control? The MEP differences during the intertrial interval (i.e. for Pulse 1; 
see Table 1) indicate that the changes in corticospinal excitability and go latencies are not (solely) due 
to the retrieval of associations between the cue or stimulus and the go/no-go response either 
(Perruchet et al., 2006). Instead, our results appear consistent with neural plasticity accounts (Dorris, 
Paré, & Munoz, 2000). Previous work suggests that residual activity of motor systems could 
contribute to sequential effects in action control tasks (Kirby 1976). Furthermore, single-cell studies 
indicate that the motor system is quickly altered by recent experiences, producing longer-lasting 
effects; and such automatic changes in the response bias of the action-control system could form the 
initial building blocks of motor learning (Dorris et al., 2000). More generally, our results are also 
consistent with hierarchical models of motor control in which the details of processing in the ‘inner 
loop’ (motor preparation and corticospinal excitability) are not necessarily available to the ‘outer 
loop’ (expectancy) (Logan & Crump, 2011).4
4 We thank our pal Gordon for suggesting this idea. 
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Previous studies have shown that bottom-up influences modulate actions in unpredictable 
environments. The present study shows that such influences still modulate actions in entirely 
predictable environments. Models of cognitive control and goal-directed behavior propose that people 
create expectations about upcoming events and proactively modify activity of perceptual and motor 
systems accordingly. Our results indicate that advance action control may be restricted in nature. Top-
down control and proactively biasing response options are effortful (e.g. Braver, 2012), and most 
people prefer to avoid it when possible (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010). Thus, even 
though people can predict what will happen next, they may not always adjust their behavior 
accordingly. Such ‘failures to engage’ (De Jong 2000) could open the door for the more ‘bottom-up’ 
influences on action control we have identified here. Future studies can explore if motivating people 
and encouraging proactive control can reduce the bottom-up influences on MEPs and RTs in both 
predictable and unpredictable environments. 
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 Appendix
Table A1: Mean and standard deviations for the dependent variables of interest.
Table A2: Overview of univariate analyses to explore the effect of Run Type and Run Position on 
Expectancy Ratings, Motor Evoked Potentials (MEP) for Pulse 1 and Pulse 2 trials, and response 
latencies (RT; note that RT data were only produced on go trials). Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-
values are reported. 
Expectancy
MEP Pulse 1
MEP Pulse 2
RT
Accuracy
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
Go1
7.05
1.62
1384
975
1007
827
660
275
0.0
0.0
Go2
7.72
1.87
2299
1481
1469
1465
550
154
0.0
0.0
Go3
7.71
1.99
2207
1773
1315
1274
538
159
0.0
0.0
Go4
7.74
1.98
1983
1392
1311
1120
537
162
0.0
0.0
Go5
7.49
1.93
1899
1252
1218
1076
548
175
0.0
0.0
NoGo1
2.97
1.41
1880
1442
1226
1169
4.7
4.1
Nogo2
2.16
1.88
1426
1181
1007
885
0.6
1.2
Nogo3
2.16
1.95
1291
972
650
588
0.0
0.0
Nogo4
2.15
1.95
1305
1184
743
625
0.2
0.8
Nogo5
2.47
1.82
1322
1052
820
734
0.4
1.5
Expectancy
MEP Pulse1
MEP Pulse 2
RT
Run Type
Run Position
Type x Position
Run Type
Run Position
Type x Position
Run Type
Run Position
Type x Position
Run Position
Df1
1
4
4
1
4
4
1
4
4
4
Df2
15
60
60
15
60
60
15
60
60
60
SS1
1065.49
0.14
13.48
10391891
1428150
10736847
5624981
1351374
3853323
175327
SS2
493.08
7.86
60.95
10748643
10542930
22211297
7104247
9365766
11419358
268273
F
36.40
0.26
3.31
14.50
2.03
7.25
11.88
2.16
5.06
9.80
p
.001
.709
.077
.002
.142
.003
.004
.137
.014
.001
η2gen
.675
<. 001
.025
.039
.006
.041
.035
.008
.024
.060
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Supplementary Materials
Instructions for the Experiment
Half of the participants were given the following scenario: "In this experiment you are a 
paramedic equipped to administer adrenaline. You are called out to see a number of people. Half have 
a nut allergy and half are diabetic. Each person has eaten a meal before calling you. The meal will be 
represented on screen as a brown cylinder. Sometimes the cylinder will represent peanut butter and 
sometimes brown sugar. You will see patients in rounds of 5, i.e. 5 nut allergy patients followed by 5 
diabetic patients followed by 5 nut allergy patients and so on. Whenever you see a brown cylinder you 
are to rate the extent you think the patient is going to have eaten brown sugar and will need insulin. 
You do this using the numerical keypad with your right hand pressing one of nine buttons. They range 
from: 1 (I definitely think the patient will not need insulin), to 5 (I do not know either way) to 9 (I 
definitely think the patient will need insulin). If the patient has eaten peanut butter and needs 
adrenaline, press the bottom mouse key as fast as you can to administer the adrenaline. However, if 
the patient has eaten brown sugar you do not need to administer adrenaline so do not press anything 
to pass them on to another medic who will deal with them. You will hear an intermittent clicking 
throughout the experiment, this is the equipment taking measurements from you. Please ignore this. 
There will be 8 blocks of patients in this experiment in between which you should take a short break 
and start the next block when the experimenter is ready". The go/no-go mapping was reversed for the 
other participants (i.e. brown sugar = go; peanut butter = no-go), so instructions were changed 
accordingly. Note that all participants had to rate the extent they thought the patient had eaten the 
substance that did not require a response (i.e. the no-go stimulus).
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Additional results
We have plotted the averages after excluding go trials for which the expectancy rating was lower than 
8, and no-go trials was higher than 2.
Expectancy
Go1
Go2
Go3
Go4
Go5
NoGo1
NoGo2
NoGo3
NoGo4
NoGo5
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NoGo2
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NoGo5
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400 500 600 700
As can be seen, the results are very similar to the results reported in the main manuscript. A 
comparison with the expectancy panel shows that the MEP and expectancy data are misaligned: 
despite large differences in expectancy ratings, MEPs on Go1 trials are similar to the MEPs for 
NoGo5 trials; however, they increase substantially after the first go trial (i.e. Go2-Go5). Similarly, 
MEPs for NoGo1 trials are similar to the MEPs for Go5 trials, but they decreases throughout the nogo 
run. There was also a large RT cost at the beginning of a go run. In sum, the MEP and RT pattern is 
not consistent with the expectancy pattern.
We did not perform statistical tests because of missing observations for a few subjects (most of their 
expectancy ratings were between 3 and 7) and a relatively low number of observations for a few other 
subjects.
